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Living Wills: How Legal Entity Rationalization
Addresses the “Too Big to Fail” Problem
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) resolution plan
requirement—commonly referred to as “living will” requirement—were
finalized just over five years ago by the Federal Reserve Board (the
“Fed”) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”)
(collectively, the “Agencies”).1 The living will requirement is one
device in an arsenal of regulatory provisions designed to solve the “too
big to fail” (“TBTF”) problem.2 A financial institution is considered
TBTF if the government would be compelled to intervene to prevent it
from failing because such failure would devastate the economy.3 The
living will requirement aims to address TBTF by requiring “covered
companies”4 to design and implement procedures that would allow the
company to execute a “rapid and orderly resolution”5 in the event of
material financial distress or failure.6 If a living will does not reflect the
1. Resolution Plans Required, 26 Fed. Reg. 67323, 67323 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 243).
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, §1, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010) (listing the goal to end TBTF as one of the
purposes for the Act).
3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-341, RESOLUTION PLANS:
REGULATORS HAVE REFINED THEIR REVIEW PROCESSES BUT COULD IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY
AND TIMELINESS 2 n.5 (2016) [hereinafter GAO-16-341], http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/
676497.pdf (defining TBTF as “a market notion that the federal government would
intervene to prevent the failure of a systemically important financial institution (“SIFI”) to
avoid harm to the economy”).
4. See Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 243.2(f) (2016) (defining each nonbank financial
company supervised by the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors and each bank
holding company with $50 billion or more total consolidated assets as a “covered
company”).
5. See Resolution Plans Required, 26 Fed. Reg. at 67327 (defining a rapid and orderly
resolution as a resolution that can be completed in a reasonable period of time and that
“substantially mitigates the risk that the failure of the company would have serious adverse
effects on financial stability in the United States”).
6. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
RESOLUTION PLAN ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND FIRM DETERMINATIONS 5 (2016)
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ability of the company to proceed through an orderly resolution, the
Agencies will deem the plan “not credible.”7
The eight largest bank holding companies in the nation—JP
Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corp., Wells Fargo,
Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Bank of New York Mellon, and Bank of
America—received the results of their 2015 living will submissions in
April 2016.8 The Agencies found deficiencies in five of the eight living
wills and concluded that those plans were not credible.9 Two banks
received split decisions on credibility, and Citigroup was the only bank
to pass muster under the prescribed criteria.10 After three annual
submission-and-review cycles since 2012, it has become clear that the
nation’s largest banks are still TBTF.11
Due to the perceived lack of progress toward creating credible
plans, critics are calling on the Agencies to use the authority granted to
them under Dodd-Frank to apply more restrictive prudential
requirements12 to the companies whose plans are not credible.13 In
response, the Agencies announced that banks that failed to remedy
deficiencies in their 2015 living wills by October 2016 would be subject
to “more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements or

[hereinafter FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS] (stating that the goal of resolution is to
make sure that failure of a bank holding company doesn’t have seriously adverse effects on
financial stability in the United States).
7. See Resolution Plans Required, 26 Fed. Reg. at 67325.
8. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 13.
9. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Announce
Determinations and Provide Feedback on Resolution Plans of Eight Systemically Important,
Domestic Banking Institutions (Apr. 13, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/20160413a.htm.
10. DELOITTE, PEELING BACK THE 2017 RESOLUTION PLAN GUIDANCE 4 (2016), https://
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-regulatoryresolution-plan-guidance.pdf.
11. Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice Chairman, F.D.I.C., Bd. Meeting Statement (Apr. 13,
2016), https//www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr1316a.html (concluding that “the
goal to end too big to fail and protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts remains just
that: only a goal”).
12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§165(d), 12 U.S.C §5365(d)(5)(A) (authorizing the Agencies to subject firms that fail to
submit credible plans to more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, or
restrictions on the growth, activities, or operations of the company, or any subsidiary
thereof, until such time as the company resubmits a plan that remedies the deficiencies).
13. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Donnelly, Warren Encourage Fed,
FDIC to Consider All Statutory Tools if Banks’ Living Wills Are Found Not Credible (June
20, 2016) [hereinafter Warren Press Release], https://www.warren.senate.gov/
?p=press_release&id=1162.
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restrictions on growth, activities, or operations.”14 Then, in December
2016, the Agencies subjected Wells Fargo to various limitations on
future growth after the company failed to address its living will
deficiencies in an updated submission.15
Though a majority of the nation’s largest banks are not fully
prepared for orderly resolution, the living wills process has yielded
demonstrable progress toward remedying TBTF.16 Banks have been
forced to simplify organizational structure and operations in their efforts
to pass the Agencies’ review.17 The examination of one section of the
living wills—legal entity rationalization (“LER”)—illustrates the
progress made to date and highlights the potential improvements in
bank safety and soundness that the living will requirement will provide
going forward.
LER requires firms to organize and align material entities with
critical operations and core business lines in order to address one of the
most hazardous aspects of TBTF: complexity.18 LER is just one part of
the living will evaluation process, but the significant improvements that
banks have made in this area exemplify the efficacy of the living will
requirement. Consequently, this Note concludes that the Agencies
should remain conservative in applying stringent prudential
requirements to the banks for two reasons. First, the living will
submission and review process has had a significant impact on the
TBTF problem, and second, further regulatory constraints may increase
the risk of market harm.19

Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 9.
See infra Part II.
See e.g., Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Federal Reserve System & F.D.I.C to
Gerald Hassell, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of The Bank of New York Mellon
Corp. 10 (Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter BNYM 2016 Letter] (listing steps taken by Bank of
New York Mellon to become resolvable without government aid).
17. See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF SIZE AND
COMPLEXITY OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ON CAPITAL MARKET EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 25 (2016) [hereinafter SIZE AND COMPLEXITY] (stating that firms have explored
ways to streamline and simplify organizational structures through resolution planning
process).
18. See Hal S. Scott, Interconnectedness and Contagion 5–19 (2012) [hereinafter
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION], https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/interconnectedness-and-contagion-by-hal-scott_153927406281.pdf
(listing
size,
interconnectedness, and complexity as features that warrant the designation of a large
financial institution as systemically important).
19. See Natasha Sarin & Lawrence Summers, Have Big Banks Gotten Safer?,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 27), https://
14.
15.
16.

360

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II provides an overview
of the living will requirement, describes the review process that the
Agencies use to make their credibility determinations, and explains the
LER section of the living will.20 Part III analyzes how the LER process
has enabled the simplification of bank structure and operations, thereby
resolving many of the complexity problems.21 Part IV compares the
likely effects, advantages, and drawbacks of subjecting the covered
companies to more restrictive prudential requirements when their living
wills do not pass the Agencies’ scrutiny.22 Part V concludes by
emphasizing the effectiveness of the living will requirement and
cautions against the enforcement of more stringent prudential
requirements at this stage in the regulation’s evolution.23
II. OVERVIEW OF LIVING WILLS AND LEGAL ENTITY RATIONALIZATION
A.

Requirements and Review Process

Bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50
billion or more and nonbank financial companies designated by the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “FSOC”) for supervision by
the Fed are required to submit living wills annually.24 The Agencies set
three yearly due dates staggered by the asset size of the banking entity.25
The first group includes any company with $250 billion or more in total
nonbank assets.”26 The eight largest bank holding companies—Bank of
America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan & Chase, State Street Bank, Bank of
New York Mellon, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and Citigroup—
are first wave filers.27 Each living will must include a “narrative”
section that contains detailed analyses of strategies and processes

www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2_sarinsummers.pdf (discussing impact of
bank regulatory actions on national market).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 243.2(f) (2016).
25. Id. § 243.3(a).
26. Id. §243.3(a)(1).
27. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SR 14-8, CONSOLIDATED RECOVERY
PLANNING FOR CERTAIN LARGE DOMESTIC BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 1 (Sept. 25, 2014)
[hereinafter SR 14-8].
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targeted to address the key areas of concern identified by the Agencies
as vital to an orderly resolution.28
The FDIC has a resolution plan requirement, separate from the
Dodd-Frank living will mandate, that applies to insured depository
institutions only.29 The FDIC rule requires insured
depository
institutions with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets to
develop living wills that will facilitate resolution under the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act.30 The FDIC requirement is intended to
coordinate the resolution of an insured depository institution and its
parent holding company, allowing covered firms to submit a
consolidated report sufficient to satisfy both laws.31
Further, the Dodd-Frank living will requirement will be used as
a planning tool to allow the FDIC to exercise its power under the
Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) efficiently.32 Previously, the
FDIC only had authority to resolve insured depository institutions, but
Dodd-Frank created the OLA to give the FDIC authority to resolve a
systemically important nonbank financial institution that has failed.33
The Government Accountability Office (the “GAO”) published
a report to provide insight into the living will review process conducted
by the Agencies.34 First, each plan is subject to a completeness,
vertical, and horizontal review.35 The completeness review is a twoweek process during which regulators use checklists to verify that all
required documentation and basic information have been submitted by

28. See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
GUIDANCE FOR 2017 §165(d) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMESTIC
COVERED COMPANIES THAT SUBMITTED RESOLUTION PLANS IN JULY 2015 2 (2016)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE 2017], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
bcreg20160413a1.pdf (outlining six key areas of concern: capital, liquidity, governance,
operations, derivatives and trading, and legal entity rationalization).
29. Resolution Plan Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67323, 67329 (Nov. 1, 2011) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pt 243).
30. Id.
31. See e.g., CITIGROUP, 2014 RESOLUTION PLAN FOR CITIGROUP INC. & CITIBANK, N.A.
1 (June 20, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup1g-20140701.pdf (titling document as §165(d) and IDI Resolution Plan).
32. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC QUARTERLY no. 2, 2011, at 41 (describing how
resolution plan would have provided insight required to plan orderly resolution of Lehman
Brothers Holdings).
33. Id. at 31.
34. GAO-16-341, supra note 3.
35. GAO-16-341, supra note 3.
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each company.36 The vertical review identifies shortcomings and
deficiencies in an individual company’s living will, and the horizontal
review tracks issues that arise across all living wills.37 Following each
review, regulators prepare summaries of each living will, which are
reviewed at a higher level by both the Oversight Group38 and the
Resolution Plan Vetting Committees39 at the FDIC and the Fed
respectively.40 Finally, the Board of Directors for the FDIC and the
Federal Reserve Board of Governors vote on the credibility of plans,
using the summaries prepared by regulators.41
The GAO report included two areas of concern and
recommendations for the Agencies to consider, the first of which
addressed the lack of transparency in the credibility determination
process.42 The GAO suggested that the Agencies release the framework
used to make decisions about the adequacy of living will submissions.43
In response to this feedback, the Agencies released a public document
with a list of the major parts of the plans and a short explanation of what
each part requires. However, no framework for determining credibility
has been released.44
B.

Results of Past Submissions

As projected, the living wills process has been an iterative one,
which has allowed the banks to improve their plans by implementing
tailored feedback.45 To achieve this, the Agencies required first wave
filers to submit initial plans by July 1, 2012.46 The Fed made it clear
GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 18.
See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 18–19 (describing vertical review as a firm
specific review which identifies “issues, shortcomings, and obstacles to resolvability” and
horizontal review identifies key issues across all plans which informs general guidance).
38. An interdivisional group of senior executives that directs review of staff-level
shortcomings and recommends findings to the FDIC Board of Directors. GAO-16-341,
supra note 3, at 20.
39. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 20 (describing the Fed’s Resolution Plan Vetting
Committee which performs same tasks as FDIC’s Oversight Group).
40. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 20.
41. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 20–21.
42. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 56–57.
43. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 56–57.
44. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6.
45. See FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 13 (“The resolution plan
rule established an iterative process . . . .”).
46. See Resolution Plan Required, 12 C.F.R. § 243.3(a)(i) (2016) (setting July 2012
36.
37.
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that it would issue individualized advice to help improve each
company’s structure and operations based upon the first plan in order to
provide guidance and direction for future submissions.47 Accordingly,
the companies’ 2012 submissions were not evaluated for credibility.48
Instead, the Agencies completed a horizontal review and released a
guidance document with specific instructions, including key
considerations that each firm should address in the narrative section of
subsequent plans.49
Despite overall improvements in the 2013 living will
submissions, the Agencies’ reviews—which were not released until
August 2014—noted deficiencies in each company’s plan.50 The Fed
determined that each bank had shortcomings that should be addressed,
while the FDIC felt that the deficiencies were enough to deem the plans
not credible.51 The law dictates that both the FDIC and the Fed agree
before a credibility determination prevails, therefore the banks received
another opportunity to satisfy the living will requirements.52 The
Agencies provided feedback for the banks to use while preparing their
July 2015 living wills.53 In addition, staff at both Agencies were
available to answer questions related to living will preparation.54
The iterative nature of the living wills process has allowed the

due date for any covered company that has $250 billion or more in total nonbank assets).
47. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 9–10 (“The Board of Governors noted that . . .
the initial resolution plans would provide the foundation for developing more robust plans
over the next few years.”).
48. But see Hal Scott, The Mystery of ‘Living Will’ Rules for Banks, WALL ST. J. (Sept.
3, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hal-scott-the-mystery-of-living-will-rules-for-banks1409786558 (asserting that the Agencies undermine the living will process by failing to
provide clear guidance on how to achieve credibility).
49. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
GUIDANCE FOR 2013 §165(d) ANNUAL RESOLUTION PLAN SUBMISSIONS BY DOMESTIC
COVERED COMPANIES THAT SUBMITTED INITIAL RESOLUTION PLANS IN 2012 1 (2013)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR 2013], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
bcreg20130415c2.pdf.
50. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. & Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Agencies Provide Feedback on Second Round Resolution Plans of “First-Wave” Filers
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140805a.htm.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Letter from Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. to Lloyd Blankfein, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc. 3 (Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter GS 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/goldman-sachs-letter-20160413.pdf.
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Agencies to take an active role in shaping each bank’s recovery and
resolution process.55 Between the guidance issued in 2013 and 2016,
the Agencies refined the focus of their assessments56 and identified six
key areas of concern that each company must thoroughly address:
capital, liquidity, governance, operations, derivatives and trading
activities, and LER.57 Though earlier feedback emphasized quality and
scope of living wills, more recent feedback has focused on changes that
companies have made or failed to make in the six main areas.58 While
attentiveness to each area of concern is vital to an orderly resolution,
LER addresses the heart of TBTF, namely, the size and complexity
arising from the organizational structure of an institution.59
C.

Legal Entity Rationalization

LER is described by the Agencies as the process of simplifying
the legal entity structure of a corporation in a way that facilitates a rapid
and orderly resolution.60 The process involves four main tasks:
developing resolution-focused LER criteria, establishing a governance
procedure to realign current material entities in accordance with those
criteria, ensuring ongoing adherence to LER criteria, and devising plans
to enable separate resolution for each material entity in a bank’s
structure.61 LER criteria are guidelines used to simplify the hierarchy of
material entities, and to align those entities with critical operations and
core business lines in a way that best meets the needs of a firm’s
resolution strategy.62 To meet the Agencies’ expectations, LER criteria

55. ARANTXA JARQUE & DAVID A. PRICE, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND,
LIVING WILLS: A TOOL FOR CURBING TOO BIG TO FAIL 4, 9 (2014), https://
www.richmondfed.org/-/media/richmondfedorg/publications/research/annual_report/2014/
pdf/ar.pdf.
56. GAO-16-341, supra note 36.
57. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 17, at 10.
58. PWC, FIRST TAKE, TEN KEY POINTS FROM REGULATORS’ FEEDBACK TO WAVE 1
RESOLUTION PLAN FILERS 2 (2014), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatoryservices/publications/assets/first-take-dodd-frank-act-resolution-planning.pdf.
59. See ARANTXA JARQUE & DAVID A. PRICE, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND,
LIVING WILLS FOR SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: SOME EXPECTED
BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 3 (2015) (describing the relationship between large institutions
and complexities involved with their resolution).
60. FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 10.
61. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28.
62. See FRAMEWORK AND DETERMINATIONS, supra note 6, at 1.

2017]

RESOLUTION PLANS ADDRESS TBTF

365

must be clear, actionable, and focused on resolution considerations.63
Resolution-focused criteria will enable: (1) recapitalization and
liquidity support of material entities; (2) provide for the sale, transfer, or
wind-down of discrete operations; (3) prioritize protection of all insured
depository institutions; and (4) ensure minimal complexity throughout
the firm’s hierarchy.64
After designing LER criteria sufficient to meet their resolution
goals, banks must establish a governance process to apply the criteria to
their current holding company structure and to ensure ongoing
adherence to them.65 This means that firms must implement their LER
criteria to simplify and prepare the existing corporate structure for
resolution,66 and they must consult their LER criteria as they grow or
decide to add new business lines.67 The Agencies emphasized how vital
it is that business-as-usual (profit-focused) considerations, which
usually motivate decisions to expand activities or add new entities, do
not eclipse the consideration of LER and orderly resolution.68
In addition to bringing the corporate structure into alignment
with LER criteria, the banks must develop options to sell or transfer
material entities and business lines in a piecemeal fashion.69 To
accomplish this, the bank must identify all material entities70 and detail

63. Letter from Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. to James Dimon, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of JP Morgan Chase & Co. 19
(Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter JP Morgan Chase 2016 Letter].
64. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 10 (setting out list of priorities that LER
criteria should achieve when applied to a corporation’s structure and activities).
65. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 20 (“[T]he plan should include a description
of the firm’s legal entity rationalization governance process.”).
66. See BNYM 2016 Letter, supra note 16, at 10 (discussing how firms are expected to
evaluate their legal entity structures against their rationalization criteria and make
appropriate adjustments and thereby implement their criteria).
67. See Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp. to John Stumpf, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of Wells Fargo & Co. 8 (Apr. 12,
2016) [hereinafter WF 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
bcreg/wells-fargo-letter-20160413.pdf
(emphasizing that application of LER criteria should allow firm to prioritize resolution
when determining which projects to undertake).
68. Id.
69. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 14 (“The firm should identify discrete
operations that could be sold or transferred in resolution.”).
70. See GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 10 (“Material entities should encompass
those entities, including foreign offices and branches, that are significant to the maintenance
of a critical operation or core business line.”).
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how critical operations71 are supported by each.72 Further, the
interconnections and shared services between each material entity must
be mapped along with a plan to address disruptions of shared services
caused by any sale or transfer that would impact multiple entities.73 The
goal of separability is to enable a firm to wind down activities of a
failed company without any negative impact on the stability of any
solvent material entities or critical operations that remain.74
The Fed placed additional emphasis on the separability facet of
LER in the context of recovery planning in a 2014 supervisory letter
directed to the eight largest banks.75 Recovery planning is distinct from
resolution planning in that it enables a bank to respond to financial
catastrophes by taking actions to stabilize the firm and prevent it from
failing.76 The separability options devised for resolution should be
supported by the same analysis required for recovery planning.77 This
means that the living will should discuss mitigating actions for all
relevant obstacles to the sale or transfer of significant assets or legal
entities.78 Examples of possible impediments include: interconnectivity
among operations that may suffer interruption during the sale of a legal
entity, market conditions that might affect availability of buyers or
going concern value of assets, or tax and regulatory consequences
connected to the sale, transfer, or wind-down of an entity.79
Banks that carefully incorporated agency guidelines for
establishing LER criteria and implementation received a favorable
assessment for this portion of their 2015 plans.80 For example,
71. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 14–21 (referencing the final rule which defines
critical operations as “the operations of a company for which the failure or discontinuance
would pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States”).
72. GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 4.
73. GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 12.
74. GUIDANCE FOR 2013, supra note 49, at 4.
75. SR 14-8, supra note 26, at 1.
76. SR 14-8, supra note 26, at 1.
77. See GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 19 (“[T]he plan should include a description
of the firm’s legal entity rationalization governance process.”).
78. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 1.
79. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 1.
80. See, e.g,. Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the F.D.I.C to
James Gorman, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer of Morgan Stanley 5 (Apr. 14, 2016)
[hereinafter MS 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
morgan-stanley-letter-20160413.pdf (acknowledging Morgan Stanley for developing
specific LER criteria which focus on resolvability of the firm, reducing number of legal
entities, separating and simplifying structure of operations).
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Citigroup received commendation for developing specific LER criteria,
identifying discrete objects to sell, and reducing its asset size.81 Further,
Citigroup reduced its number of business lines, thereby reducing its
total number of legal entities by 40%.82 The firm also plans to reduce
its number of legal entities by an additional 25% before the July 2017
living will submission.83 Accordingly, the Agencies did not find any
deficiencies or shortcomings in this area of Citigroup’s submission.84
On the other hand, firms that did not design specific, actionable
LER criteria, failed to implement their criteria, or did not adequately
describe the governance process for continued adherence to LER,
received poor reviews from the Agencies.85 For example, Wells Fargo
was tasked with redesigning its LER criteria because the previous
criteria prioritized business-as-usual concerns, such as tax advantages
and regulatory arbitrage, over resolvability considerations.86 In addition
to rethinking LER criteria, the Agencies directed the bank to set out the
governance process it will use to ensure that the criteria are applied on
an ongoing basis.87 This illustrates that the living will process is much
more than a “fig leaf for TBTF.”88 To the contrary, the regulators fully
expect the banks to make all changes necessary to bring operations in
line with their chosen resolution strategy.
Wells Fargo received another opportunity to demonstrate that it
had progressed and cured the LER deficiencies in its October 2016
living will submission.89 In the public portion of its latest submission,
the bank reported the development of clear, actionable, resolutionfocused LER criteria with accompanying rationale and application

81. Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the F.D.I.C to Michael
O’Neill, Chairman, and Michael Corbat, Chief Exec. Officer of Citigroup Inc. 4 (Apr. 12,
2016) [hereinafter Citigroup 2016 Letter], https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/bcreg/citi-letter-20160413.pdf.
82. CITIGROUP, CITIGROUP INC. RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC SECTION, 19 (July 1, 2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/citi-165-1507.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Citigroup 2016 Letter, supra note 81, at 4.
85. WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 8.
86. WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 8.
87. WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 8.
88. Barbara A. Rehm, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Curious Bequest: The Living Will, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 23, 2010) (asserting that the living will requirement is nothing more than a
fig leaf for TBTF).
89. See WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at 9 (listing actions that Wells Fargo must
complete before October 2016 submission to remedy deficiencies).
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protocols for each.90 Wells Fargo used external industry experts in
addition to an internal workgroup staffed with subject matter experts to
review the bank’s LER criteria.91 To address the deficiency in its LER
governance process, the firm created several procedures and new
practices.92 One of these is an application protocol to be used to help
management apply the LER criteria on an ongoing basis.93 Another
notable improvement was the event-driven legal entity assessment
decision tree, which describes the process to be used when making
decisions that will affect the corporate structure.94 The decision tree
includes a list of business decisions—such as mergers or acquisitions,
new products, or geographic expansion—that might trigger the need for
assessment.95
The Agencies determined that the aforementioned procedures
and processes did not adequately address the LER deficiencies found in
Wells Fargo’s 2015 living will, and the redesigned LER criteria failed
to address specific obstacles to resolution in connection with the firm’s
resolution strategy.96 The examples provided in the event-driven legal
entity assessment decision tree were deemed inadequate because they
did not include precise actions that management could take to align
legal entities and business lines.97 In one example, the application of
LER criteria to a current business line only triggered the need for
additional research by management, instead of a weighing of obstacles
and vulnerabilities associated with resolution that the business line
presented.98 A better way to show that LER criteria are clear and
actionable, in the Agencies’ view, would have been to include examples
of how the criteria could be applied in a way that would facilitate
resolution, a showing that the current alignment is resolvable under the

90. WELLS FARGO & CO., 2016 RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC SECTION 13 (2016), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/wells-fargo-2g-20161001.pdf.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Letter from Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & the F.D.I.C to
Timothy Sloan, Chief Exec. Officer and President of Wells Fargo & Co., 1 (Dec. 13, 2016)
[hereinafter, WF Dec. 2016 Letter] (“[T]he Agencies have jointly determined that the 2016
Submission does not adequately remedy the deficiencies related to LER Criteria . . . .”).
97. See id. (discussing the inadequacies of the assessment framework).
98. Id. at 4.
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bank’s current strategy, or analysis of how the criteria mitigate risks to
orderly resolution.99
Wells Fargo is the first company to be penalized due to living
will deficiencies.100 The bank is currently forbidden from establishing
foreign banks or foreign branches and acquiring any nonbanking
subsidiaries.101 Further, if the deficiencies are not cured by March
2017, then Wells Fargo’s nonbank entity and broker-dealer total asset
size will be limited to the level reported in September 2016.102 The Fed
decided to restrict activities three months after its investigation into
illegal banking practices perpetrated by Wells Fargo employees began,
although the Agencies insist that the sanctions were unrelated to the
firm’s sham-accounts fraud.103 Nonetheless, it is difficult to reconcile
this credibility determination in light of the progress Wells Fargo has
made toward simplifying its structure and operations.
Evaluating the propriety of the Agencies’ decision is
challenging for several reasons. First, as the GAO espoused in its report
on the living will process, the Agencies and the banks refuse to disclose
much detail to the public about the contents of the living wills.104 As a
result, a balanced assessment of Wells Fargo’s—or any covered
company’s—progress year after year is not possible, and the public
must rely on the Agencies to report this information.105 Second, even
increased disclosure may not provide the means necessary to evaluate
progress because many living wills are said to be over 10,000 pages

99. See id. at 5–6 (listing ways that Wells Fargo could have demonstrated that the LER
criteria it developed would be clear and actionable during resolution).
100. Ryan Tracy, Wells Fargo Sanctioned by U.S. Regulators for ‘Living Will’
Deficiencies, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-regulatorssanction-wells-fargo-declaring-living-will-deficiencies-1481664744.
101. WF Dec. 2016 Letter, supra note 96, at 9.
102. WF Dec. 2016 Letter, supra note 96, at 10.
103. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/
dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html (reporting that Wells
Fargo employees engaged in illegal banking practices that involved opening nearly two
million fraudulent banking and credit card accounts without customer consent).
104. See JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 59, at 4 (reporting that the banks decide what to
include in the public sections of the living wills and that the level of disclosure has been
minimal).
105. See JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 59, at 4 (“[M]aintaining confidentiality must be
weighed against the need for a meaningful level of disclosure about the firm’s ability to be
resolved without assistance.”).
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long.106 Third, the Agencies have not disclosed their framework for
assessing deficiencies to covered companies or the public, which is
necessary to determine whether the credibility determinations are made
using objective criteria.107 Despite these gaps in information, the
publicly available documents that report the progress made by Wells
Fargo and other covered companies depict an industry that is investing
substantial resources to remedy the complexity inherent with TBTF.108
III. HOW LEGAL ENTITY RATIONALIZATION REMEDIES COMPLEXITY OF
LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A.

LER Addresses Structural Complexity

Many of the complications caused by disorderly resolution of
large firms stem from the vast number of legal entities in their corporate
structures, which make it difficult to organize and consolidate legal
proceedings.109 Cautionary examples of such difficulties abound in
various accounts of the largest corporate failures in U.S. history, the
most notable of which is the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings
(“Lehman”).110 When Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008,
there were over 400 subsidiaries111 in more than forty jurisdictions
under the company’s structure.112 The structure of material entities—
likely driven by tax, accounting, and regulatory advantages without
regard to resolution considerations113—led to seventy-five different
bankruptcy proceedings114 with some actions occurring concurrently on
106. See JACOPO CARMASSI & RICHARD J. HERRING, CORPORATE STRUCTURES,
TRANSPARENCY AND RESOLVABILITY OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS 160
(Aug. 2014) (“Many documents submitted are reported to exceed ten thousand pages in
length . . . . “).
107. See GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 27 (reporting that the Agencies have not
disclosed frameworks to plan filers or to the public).
108. See e.g., WELLS FARGO & CO., supra note 90, at 13 (detailing formation of internal
living will oversight office in addition to consultation with external resolution experts).
109. JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 55, at 13.
110. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 19.
111. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 211.
112. Nizan Pakin, The Case Against Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills Contingency
Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUSINESS L.J. 29, 81 (2014).
113. See CARMASSI & HERRING, supra note 106, at 153 (explaining why global
institutions adopt complex legal structures without regard for possible obstacles to orderly
resolution).
114. CARMASSI & HERRING, supra note 106, at 153.
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three continents.115
Citigroup is substantially larger and more globally active than
Lehman.116 However, the living will process, and more specifically the
LER requirement, has prompted Citigroup to streamline its operations
and downsize where possible to mitigate obstacles that would otherwise
impede resolution.117 For instance, after identifying core business lines,
critical operations, and material entities, Citigroup sold non-core
business lines and subsidiaries and divested assets in various domestic
and foreign businesses.118 Although Citigroup has retained a substantial
number of entities, LER has improved the way that the firm organizes
and manages those entities by bringing recovery and resolution to the
forefront of corporate activity.119 This trend holds true to varying
degrees for all eight of the covered companies.
Despite the costly efforts undertaken by TBTF firms to reduce
complexity, Richard Fisher, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, in a statement to the U.S. House of Representatives, asserted
that these institutions are still too complex and impervious for the living
will to have any effect on the resolution of a failed firm.120 This
contention has some merit because the arrangement of legal entities can
complicate bankruptcy proceedings considerably.121 Clearly, Lehman

115. Jonathan Macey, Are Any Creditors “Particularly Deserving”?: On the Enduring
Attraction of the Ring-Fence Approach to Cross-Border Insolvencies of Fin. Institutions, 31
YALE J. ON REG. 695, 709 (2014).
116. Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, Donnelly, Warren Encourage Fed,
FDIC to Consider All Statutory Tools if Banks’ Living Wills Are Found Not Credible (June
20, 2016), https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1162.
117. CITIGROUP INC., OCTOBER SUBMISSION PUBLIC SECTION 22 (2016), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup-1g-20161001.pdf (detailing
efforts undertaken by Citigroup to streamline its organization).
118. See id. at 22 (listing non-core business lines that were sold, including one consumer
lending company, resulting in a 70% reduction in non-core assets).
119. Id.
120. See Richard W. Fisher, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Dallas, Statement before
the Comm. on Fin. Servs.: Correcting ‘Dodd-Frank’ to Actually End ‘Too Big to Fail’ 9
(June 26, 2013), https://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130626.aspx
(“Given the complexity and opacity of the TBTF institutions and the ability to move assets
and liabilities across subsidiaries and affiliates . . . a living will would likely be ineffective
when it really mattered.”).
121. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-707, BANKRUPTCY: COMPLEX
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION POSE CHALLENGES 28 (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11707.pdf (reporting that complex institutions are difficult
to resolve through bankruptcy proceedings in part because of their incongruent legal
structures).
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expanded its organization with little regard for how legal entities could
be resolved in the event of bankruptcy.122 In most instances, the legal
entities did not align with the operational structure of the company,
making it difficult to map interconnections among subsidiaries.123
Many core business lines were scattered across multiple subsidiaries
because of the haphazard structure of
material
entities.124
Consequently, as each subsidiary was sold to a new owner, the company
lost access to information necessary to appraise and liquidate assets.125
In a situation like Lehman’s, where the corporate structure was
already in disarray when it failed, a living will may not have any
discernible effect on the resolution process.126 However, achieving
credibility under the living will requirement mandates that the banks
engage in LER by identifying a resolution strategy and reorganizing
their organization to coincide with that strategy.127 Therefore, in the
event that a covered company does fail, the living will shall provide a
map of the organization’s material entities, core business lines, and
critical operations, as well as a separability strategy to enable rapid
liquidation of assets.128 Further, the information in the living wills
provides the Agencies with ongoing insight into the unique operations
of each firm and enables them to disseminate targeted feedback to
improve resolvability.129
B.

LER Addresses Financial and Operational Complexity
When the parent holding company of an organization becomes

122. Richard Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Corporate Structure of International
Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 196, 225 (Allen N. Berger et al. eds., 2012).
123. Stephen J. Lubben & Sara Pei Woo, Reconceptualizing Lehman, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J.
297, 303–04 (2014).
124. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 38.
125. GAO-16-341, supra note 3, at 38.
126. MICHAEL FLEMING & ASANI SARKAR, THE FAILURE RESOLUTION OF LEHMAN
BROTHERS 188 (2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/
1412flem.pdf (highlighting the delays caused by the organizational complexity of Lehman
which made it difficult to identify which Lehman subsidiaries creditors had claims against).
127. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 10.
128. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28, at 19.
129. See JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 55, at 6 (concluding that increased understanding
of the characteristics of each individual firm is one way to reduce the risk of future
bailouts).
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financially and operationally interconnected with its material entities,
separating the failing holding company from its solvent subsidiaries for
parent
resolution becomes difficult.130 For example, Lehman’s
company, Lehman Brothers Holdings, functioned by lending operating
funds to its subsidiaries at the start of each day and collecting the cash
at the end of each day.131 On September 15, 2008, Lehman filed for
bankruptcy before funding its material entities, tying much of its cash
up in bankruptcy and preventing its affiliates from sustaining critical
operations.132
To reduce financial and operational complexity that might
otherwise obstruct an orderly resolution, the Fed adopted a final rule
that requires large banks to adhere to a set of operating limitations
called clean holding company requirements.133 The clean holding
company requirements limit the ability of parent holding companies to
enter into certain financial arrangements with subsidiaries that may
complicate resolution.134 The regulation prohibits: (1) bank holding
companies from acquiring third-party debt instruments with an original
maturity of less than one year; (2) guaranteeing subsidiary debt if doing
so would result in the holding company’s insolvency; and (3)
organizing upstream guarantees which occur when subsidiaries
guarantee holding company debt.135
The clean holding company requirements embody some of the
goals of LER in that each restraint serves to reduce the operational
complexity of a large financial institution and thereby prevent the
contagion effects that exacerbated the financial crisis.136 Requiring a
minimum of one year for third-party debt instrument maturity mitigates

130. See Martin J. Gruenberg, Chairman, F.D.I.C., A Progress Report on the Resolution
of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (May 12, 2015), https://www.fdic.gov/
news/news/speeches/spmay1215.html (“The inability to resolve one legal entity without
causing knock-on effects that may propel the failure of other legal entities within the firm
makes the orderly resolution . . . extremely problematic.”).
131. Herring & Carmassi, supra note 122, at 225.
132. Herring & Carmassi, supra note 122, at 225.
133. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., TLAC and Clean
Holding Company Requirements Finalized (Dec. 15, 2016) https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/bcreg/20161215a.htm.
134. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 25.
135. Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity, Long-Term Debt, and Clean Holding Company
Requirements, 80 Fed. Reg. 74926, 74944 (Nov. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
217 and 252).
136. Id.
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risks of funding runs, asset fire sales, and runs on other large financial
institutions.137 By limiting upstream guarantees, the holding company
will be allowed to fail while its solvent subsidiaries continue to operate,
ensuring continuity of shared services through resolution.138 Finally,
limiting the activity of the bank holding company creates a simplified
legal and operational structure which supports orderly resolution.139
While striving to satisfy the LER requirement and the clean
holding company requirements, covered companies have simplified
their operations from the top-tier holding company downward.140
Overall, the firms have substantially reduced their total number of
entities and restructured their organizations.141 For example, Bank of
New York Mellon is in the process of moving its Indian subsidiary
under its main bank;142 Goldman Sachs separated its operating entities
from its investing entities;143 and Morgan Stanley separated its
investment management business from its institutional broker-dealer.144
Further, all eight of the nation’s largest banks are operating in
accordance with the clean holding company rule, even though
compliance is not due until January 2019.145 This demonstrates that the
banks are making strides toward addressing the complexity inherent in
TBTF institutions.146 Going forward, the Fed should refrain from
imposing more prudential requirements on the banks.
IV. STRINGENT PRUDENTIAL REQUIREMENTS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED
A.

Prudential Requirements Generally

While the nation’s complex financial institutions have become
larger since the crisis, the living wills process has made them less

Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., MS 2016 Letter, supra note 80, at 5 (noting the adjustments made in
ownership structure).
141. Citigroup 2016 Letter, supra note 81, at 4.
142. BNYM 2016 Letter, supra note 16, at 5.
143. GS 2016 Letter, supra note 54, at 5.
144. MS 2016 Letter, supra note 80, at 5.
145. BNYM 2015 Letter, supra note 16, at 10.
146. INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 238.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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vulnerable to financial distress.147 Further, each living will review cycle
has provided information that is being used to mitigate obstacles to an
orderly resolution in the event of financial distress.148 Despite this,
many are calling for the Fed to impose more stringent prudential
requirements149 on banks that fail to resolve deficiencies in their plans
in the next submission cycle.150 Though the threat of stricter prudential
restraints provides a strong incentive for banks to comply with the
living will requirement, the enforcement of any one of these measures
could have negative impacts that extend beyond the covered company’s
operations.151
The Fed and the FDIC set out the process used to impose
additional prudential standards when a covered company fails to submit
a credible living will.152 First, if a covered company submits a plan that
is deemed deficient by the Agencies, that company has ninety days to
resubmit an updated plan that adequately addresses the deficiencies.153
Next, if the Agencies jointly determine that the revisions do not remedy
the deficiencies, then the covered company or any of its subsidiaries
may be subjected to “more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity
requirements or restrictions on growth, activities, or operations.”154
Finally, if after two years the covered company still has not
submitted a credible plan, the Agencies may direct the company to
divest certain assets or operations.155 This illustrates the powerful tools
147. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 13 (“While large bank holding companies
have become larger, they are less vulnerable to financial distress since the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Act.”).
148. 80 Fed. Reg. 74926, 74928 (Nov. 1, 2015) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 and
252).
149. This note focuses on strict prudential standards that may be imposed as a result of
deficiencies in living wills. See Failure to Cure Deficiencies on Resubmission of a
Resolution Plan, 12 C.F.R. 243.6 (2016). However, U.S. banks are already subject to
enhanced prudential standards including mandatory capital planning, periodic stress testing,
and establishment of risk management standards. See Press release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., Final Rule to Strengthen Supervision and Regulation of Large Bank
Holding Companies (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
bcreg/20140218a.htm.
150. Warren Press Release, supra note 13.
151. See e.g., Sarin & Summers, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15) (discussing the
corresponding relationship between increased capital requirements and increased market
volatility).
152. Resolution Plans, 12 C.F.R. § 243.6.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.

376

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 21

that the Fed has at its disposal to intervene when it is appropriate to do
so. However, the use of any one of these tools could impact market
volatility and the economy.156 Therefore, regulators should only use
additional prudential requirements when the benefits of imposing the
restrictions outweigh the costs to market stability.
B.

Impacts of Restrictions on Capital, Leverage, and Liquidity
Limits

Capital, leverage, and liquidity measures are indicators of the
health of a financial institution and can be used to increase the safety
and soundness of that institution.157 Likewise, maintaining optimal
capital and liquidity while carefully monitoring leverage will help banks
weather financial crises.158 Because of this, regulators carefully
supervise these metrics and take enforcement actions when these
measures indicate that the bank is at risk for insolvency.159 Early
corrective action could prevent bank failure and thus prevent harm to
the market.160
Despite these advantages, regulatory action such as stringent
capital and liquidity minimums against a solvent bank increases market
volatility.161 For example, excessive capital requirements could
decrease investor confidence in the soundness of the bank and thereby
lower the franchise value of that institution.162 This is because
156. See e.g., Sarin & Summers, supra note 19 (manuscript at 27) (suggesting that
market volatility may have increased because of greater regulatory uncertainty).
157. See e.g., CITIGROUP, CITIGROUP INC. RESOLUTION PLAN PUBLIC SECTION, 15 (July
1,
2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans/citigroup-1g20150701.pdf (detailing actions taken to maintain capital and liquidity levels vital to the
successful execution of resolution strategy).
158. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 3.
159. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 3.
160. SR 14-8, supra note 27, at 3.
161. See Sarin & Summers, supra note 19, (manuscript at 34). In this report, Natasha
Sarin of the Harvard University Department of Economics and Lawrence Summer of the
JFK School of Government at Harvard conclude that the franchise value of banks, measured
by the ratio of price to book value and the ratio of the market value of equity to assets, has
declined since the financial crisis. The report asserts that “part of the reason for declines in
franchise value is regulatory activity and the prospect of future regulation” and that “[t]here
is a possibility that by further eroding bank franchise value, further regulatory actions could
actually increase systemic risk.”
162. See INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 110 (explaining how
government policy during the 2008 crisis exacerbated the financial crisis because concern
about the health of the banks increased after the announcement of the TARP program).

2017]

RESOLUTION PLANS ADDRESS TBTF

377

government intervention causes concerns about the health of large
financial institutions.163 Further, increased capital requirements would
require the bank to forego investments that would yield profit for their
investors and benefit the market.164 Not surprisingly, economists have
observed that “a large part of the reason for declines in franchise value
is regulatory activity and the prospect of future regulation.”165
C.

Impacts of Restrictions on Growth, Activities, Operations

It makes sense to limit the growth of an institution that is
considered TBTF, because many regard size as the most significant risk
associated with banks.166 One of the concerns is that a bank that is
TBTF will be too large to be sold in the event of financial distress.167
However, the enforcement of growth limitations would impair
significant benefits that large banking firms provide to the market: the
economies of scale that they possess due to their size, and their ability
to diversify risks.168
Banks achieve economies of scale when output can be doubled
for less than a doubling of cost.169 If these cost savings are jeopardized
by regulatory limitations on growth, market participants will pay for it
through higher costs for products and services that banks provide.170
Further, research shows that size does not have as significant an impact
on bank safety as much as regulatory supervision which ensures
continued inspection of bank risk taking.171 Accordingly, the living
wills process has become an excellent tool for regulatory supervision
because it provides updated reports containing full disclosure of covered
companies’ overall operations.172
INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION, supra note 18, at 110.
See Pakin, supra note 112, at 61 (explaining how increased capital requirements
reduces the funds available to borrow for investments).
165. Sarin & Summers, supra note 19, (manuscript at 34).
166. JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 59, at 3.
167. See Pakin, supra note 112, at 91 (asserting that no single entity could purchase a
failing systemically important financial institution without government support).
168. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 9.
169. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 9.
170. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 9.
171. SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 13.
172. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 24 (stating that regulators are using
the living wills mandated by Dodd-Frank to gain understanding of the workings of large
financial institutions).
163.
164.
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The most severe of the prudential requirements would require a
bank to divest assets chosen by the Fed in its discretion.173 While
directing a financial institution to divest a business line may reduce the
risk of harm to the economy arising from that company’s failure,
limiting activities could constrain the institution’s ability to reduce the
risk of insolvency by diversifying its business lines.174 Large banks
have the unique capability to diversify risks by investing in
nontraditional banking activities, which has been shown to decrease the
risk of contagion.175 Nonetheless, diversification contributes to
complexity which increases the chances of complications during
resolution.176 To address this risk, covered companies must design
living wills that apply LER criteria to each new entity and line of
business to ensure that resolution procedures are at the forefront of
considerations related to diversifying activities.177 Therefore, it is more
advantageous to refrain from restricting activities until a covered
company has had adequate time to restructure its activities according to
the LER criteria.178
Limiting the growth of a bank is one way to address the risk
that, in the event of a failure, the government would be the only entity
available to purchase remaining assets and bail out the bank.179
However, LER requires material entities to correspond with business
lines so that they can be sold in separate, affordable pieces apart from

173. Failure to Cure Deficiencies on Resubmission of a Resolution Plan, 12 C.F.R.
243.6 (2016).
174. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 22 (“The larger the bank, the smaller
the marginal increase in contagion risk due to diversification into nontraditional banking
activities, as measured by the noninterest income share.”).
175. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 22.
176. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 26 (“To the extent diversification
leads to greater organizational complexity, that itself can present additional risks given the
increased difficulties with resolving complex institutions.”).
177. See SIZE AND COMPLEXITY, supra note 17, at 28 (explaining that the living will for
a company must identify operational interconnection to facilitate rapid transfers or sales of
legal entities or business lines).
178. DELOITTE, TACKLING TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL: THE RESOLVABILITY CHALLENGE FOR BANKS
22
(2016)
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financialservices/deloitte-uk-too-big-to-fail.pdf.
179. See Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1312
(2014) (quoting Jim Millstein, former Chief Restricting Officer of the Treasury Department
who stated: “[t]here are few if any institutions with the balance sheet to support the purchase
of one of these businesses in good times . . . there is no credible way to break [these firms]
up and sell them during a crisis”).
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the bank holding company.180 Requiring covered companies to develop
plans to recapitalize individual entities and detail steps to continue
critical operations while each is being sold will aid in the successful
transfer of these material entities.181 Therefore, the living will
requirement serves as a tailored tool to distribute bank assets without
restricting growth.
The Agencies require each covered firm to identify triggers that
signal commencement of resolution activities, such as the escalation of
information to the company’s board and the raising of capital or
liquidity before a crisis starts.182 While Lehman was unequipped to
manage the resolution of its global enterprise during the financial crisis,
firms that plan responses to a variety of scenarios will be armed with
necessary information to make better choices regardless of their size.183
The living will’s LER requirement is effective in this regard because it
facilitates advance preparation for financial crises by requiring firms to
plan specific actions in response to a variety of scenarios for each
material entity, including a separability analysis.184
Due to the potential impacts on the financial markets and the
effectiveness of the living will process, the Agencies should only
restrict bank activities when doing so is absolutely necessary. Strict
prudential requirements should only be forced upon institutions that
resist resolution planning and implementation because, as discussed,
such regulatory action could be costly to the health of the economy. On
the other hand, firms—like Wells Fargo—that are working diligently
and that invest resources to create a credible living will should be
allowed to improve without having additional restraints placed on their
business activities.
V. CONCLUSION
The living will process was designed to be iterative in order to
facilitate the supervisory goals of the regulation.185 As projected by
GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28.
DELOITTE, supra note 10, at 4.
JP Morgan 2016 Letter, supra note 63, at 15.
See Pakin, supra note 112, at 43 (stating that “preparing recovery plans forces
SIFIs to consider in advance some tough strategic choices”).
184. GUIDANCE 2017, supra note 28.
185. See Resolution Plans Required, 76 Fed. Reg. 67323, 67328 (Nov. 1, 2011)
180.
181.
182.
183.
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various scholars when the living will requirement was newly enacted,
the covered companies subject to the regulation have improved their
daily operations, organizational structure, and information systems as a
result of the planning process.186 The regulation has been in effect for
five short years, and the Agencies emphasized that significant changes
would have to be made before a complex firm could go bankrupt
without major disruptions to the financial system.187
The living wills requirement has facilitated a back and forth
dialogue that allows the Agencies to guide banks’ progress on an
individual level.188 The feedback from the Agencies guides the covered
companies in their endeavors to reshape their organization to reduce the
likelihood that the government will need to assist the firms during
resolution.189 However, the process is new and both the Agencies and
the banks are evolving.190 Further, the banks must invest in
sophisticated and costly research and development to meet the standards
set by the Agencies.191 While stringent prudential requirements may be
in order for banks that willfully refuse to adhere to the living will
guidance issued by the Agencies, it is counterproductive to penalize
covered companies, like Wells Fargo, for failing to meet standards that
they are striving to satisfy.192
Some commentators believe that the living wills requirement is
ineffective because the nation’s largest banks are still TBTF.193
However, the covered companies have taken many steps to comply with
the LER requirement which has led to a reduction in complexity and an
increase in streamlined operations in these organizations.194 The living

(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 243) (clarifying that the Agencies “expect the process of submission
and review of the initial resolution plan iterations to include an ongoing dialogue with
firms”).
186. See Pakin, supra note 112, at 62 (“[B]y preparing living wills, SIFIs will improve
their risk management systems, as well as their day-to-day operations . . . .”).
187. Baradaran, supra note 179, at 1313.
188. JARQUE & PRICE supra note 55, at 9.
189. JARQUE & PRICE supra note 55, at 11.
190. See JARQUE & PRICE supra note 55, at 9 (“It’s new and difficult terrain for both
institutions and regulators.”).
191. DELOITTE, supra note 178, at 22.
192. See Pakin, supra note 112, at 74 (endorsing the idea that severe punishment as
described in the Dodd-Frank Act should be inflicted upon those who deviate from the rules).
193. R. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 113TH CONG., FAILING TO END “TOO BIG TO
FAIL” 67 (Comm. Print 2014).
194. BNYM 2016 Letter, supra note 16, at 5; see also WF 2016 Letter, supra note 67, at
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will requirement is, through an iterative process, making the nation’s
largest banks simplify their structures to enable separability of entities
in the event of resolution.195 Thus, the living will process has enabled
the banks and the Agencies to address the complexity associated with
resolving a TBTF firm.196 The evidence of the effectiveness of the
living will process as it stands counsels against the imposition of more
stringent prudential requirements on the banks.
MONICA M. BURKS*

5 (noting that Wells Fargo has reduced its number of entities since purchasing Wachovia).
195. JARQUE & PRICE, supra note 55, at 15.
196. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo ‘Living Will’ Plan Is Rejected Again by Regulators,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/business/dealbook/wellsfargo-regulators.html (“Of all the rules passed in the wake of the crisis, this requirement is
designed to address most directly the issue of big banks’ being too big to fail.”).
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